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Abstract 
This paper has made an attempt to show that in a developing economy, agriculture and 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) can go simultaneously without affecting one another if 
appropriate subsidy policy is designed by the government. We have considered 
increasing returns brought about by external economies of scale in the SEZ-led industrial 
sector with the help of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type of production function where resource 
used to produce each variety of the SEZ-good is itself produced using constant returns to 
scale (CRS) technology and CRS is also present in the agricultural sector.   
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Introduction: 
 
"We must recognize that today skilled labour as well as capital are internationally fully 
mobile. Therefore our system of incentive has to be competitive enough to attract more 
capital both domestic and foreign." 
Dr. Manmohan Singh. 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are specifically defined duty free enclaves and are 
considered to be foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations and duties and 
tariffs. Formation of SEZs is an important constituent of the new industrial and export 
policies of India during the liberalized regime. Undoubtedly, the success of the Chinese 
SEZs in the 1980s has attracted the attention of the policymakers in the developing 
countries1 like India. The Union government policy on SEZ in India came into effect in 
April 2000. It is the latest thinking so far on India’s export policy and may even represent 
the future of industrial development strategy. In 2005, the Special Economic Zones Act 
was passed in the parliament with the purpose of establishing, developing and managing 
SEZs in the country. By June 2006, there were eight functional Special Economic Zones 
located at Santa Cruz (Maharashtra), Cochin (Kerala), Kandla and Surat (Gujarat), 
Chennai (Tamil Nadu), Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh), Falta (West Bengal) and 
Noida (Uttar Pradesh) in India and eighteen more were approved, waiting to become 
functional. By May 2007, the number of notified SEZs in the country after the passing of 
the SEZ Act of 2005 had reached one hundred. The main objectives of the SEZ Act are:                                 
(1) generation of additional economic activity 
(2) promotion of exports of goods and services; 
(3) promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources; 
                                                 
1
 According to World Bank estimates, as of 2007 there are more than 3,000 projects taking place in 
SEZs in 120 countries worldwide. 
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(4) creation of employment opportunities’ 
(5) development of infrastructural facilities; 
In addition to exemption from import and export duties, establishments in SEZs get 
sufficient incentives in terms of benefits in income tax, service tax and other obligations 
to the central and state governments. So it is not at all surprising that a large number of 
enterprises have queued up either to develop an SEZ or to enter an already established 
SEZ in India. 
It is argued that well-implemented and designed SEZ can bring about many desired 
benefits for a host-country: increases in employment, FDI attraction, general economic 
growth, foreign exchange earnings, international exposure, and the transfer of new 
technologies and skills. But the pertinent question remains: whether this procedure of 
industrialization would affect agriculture seriously. Such a dilemma has been observed in 
many predominantly agricultural countries that intend to industrialize using agricultural 
land. One can see for example: Fernandes (2007), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007) and 
Sarkar (2007) etc. The major question in this context is: can industry (SEZs) and 
agriculture grow simultaneously without hurting one another? Although Chaudhuri and 
Yabuuchi (2007) has tried to answer this question, but they did it in terms of a three-
sector Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model; while questions might be raised as 
they did not consider the increasing returns brought about by positive externalities arising 
out of localization of similar industries in one region facilitated by SEZs. So we try to 
make an attempt to answer the above question incorporating the consequent increasing 
returns brought about by external economies of scale. 
 
 4 
The model 
 
We assume that, 1X  is the agricultural product produced in the agricultural sector 1 with 
labour and capital. This is the final commodity being exported to the rest of the 
world. The production function is: 
1 1( , )X X hL K= ---------------------------------------- (1), 
where L is the given endowment of labour and h is the efficiency of labour; {h(.) L } is 
the endowment of labour in efficiency unit. Sector 2 is the industrial sector aided by SEZ 
producing 2X  with increasing returns to scale following a Dixit-Stiglitz2 pattern: 
1
2
1
n
i
i
X x
ρ
ρ
=
 
=  
 
∑ , 0 1ρ< < -----------------------------(2).  
These xis are non-traded varieties produced by monopolistically competitive producers. 
However, the final commodity 2X is also exported by this small open developing 
economy to the rest of the world at the internationally given price 2P . The 
monopolistically competitive variety producers have to use a resource ‘m’ spending ‘ a ’ 
units of ‘ m ’ to set up plants and machineries (fixed cost); then each successive unit of xis 
uses ‘b’ units of ‘m’ resources. ( ),m m hL K= ------------------------------------------ (3). 
This has all usual properties of CRS production function. Therefore, at the level of ‘m’ 
and X 1  it is absolutely usual 2×2 CRS Jones (1965) structure. Without any loss of 
generality, we can assume ‘m’ is more capital-intensive than X 1 . IRS sector 2 is imposed 
on Jones (1965) CRS structure. This is quite legitimate assumption as SEZs facilitate 
                                                 
2
 See Dixit, Avinash, K. and Stiglitz, Joseph (1977) 
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similar industries to be located together which creates positive externalities leading to 
consequent increasing returns.3 So, IRS is brought about external economies of scale. 
This ‘m’ resource is imported by this labour-abundant, small open developing economy 
from the rest of the world at the prevailing world price *mp .  
Note that‘s’ is the rate of price subsidy given to encourage formation of the SEZ. 
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
 (4)S sP X S s Xβ = ⇒ = + − − − − − − − − − − − − − −  
We assume that subsidy is given to both the agricultural sector and the SEZ. A part of the 
subsidy is gone to agriculture on the use of modern technology for improving the 
efficiency of agricultural labourers to improve their productivity. Simultaneously, in line 
with its new industrial policy sizeable amount of fiscal concessions are given on several 
occasions for encouraging formation of the SEZ. If S be the aggregate government 
expenditure or subsidy, the fraction β of it is given to the SEZ while the remaining (1−β) 
fraction is spent on the use of modern technology for productivity improvement of 
agricultural workers. 
h = h((1−β )S,W); h = h  for (1−β )S = 0 i.e. β =1; and, 1 2, 0h h > .--------(5) 
When the government spends nothing for agricultural development i.e. when β =1, h = h  
(given exogenously). However, if the government’s expenditure on agriculture is positive 
i.e., if β<1, then h′ >0; and, h > h .  
Now government may impose an import-tariff, which will increase demand for 
domestically produced importable and hence domestic price of the importable from 
*
mp to
* (1 ),m mp p t= + where‘t’ is an ad-valorem rate of tariff. To bring equilibrium in 
domestic market for the importable, domestic production of ‘m’ will also increase. 
                                                 
3
 See, Sarkar (2007) in this context. 
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∴ We assume ˆ ˆ , 0.mm Ap A= > ---------------------------------------------- (6) 
Where ˆmp t= . 
We assume price of the ith brand is qi. From the equality of marginal revenue and 
marginal cost for the ith monopolistically competitive producer,   mi
bpq
ρ
=  
     = q (symmetric across all i) -------------------------------------------------- (7) 
Or, ˆ ˆmq p= ------------------------------------------------------------------------- (7.1)     
For each unit sold, the total surplus generated over and above the marginal cost, assuming 
zero profit, must be equated with fixed cost; which gives us the amount of the ith variety 
sold ( iy ) = 
a
b
ρσ , where σ = 1
1 ρ−
. 
               = y (constant ∀ i). ------------------------------------------------------ (8) 
Since, varieties are non-traded, domestic demand = domestic supply  
                                                Or, xi = y 
                                                Or, x = y. ----------------------------------------- (9) 
∴xs are also symmetrically entering the production function (2), all varieties have same 
prices. 
( ) 1 12X nx n x n xρ αρ ρ∴ = = = , where ( )1 1α ρ= > -------------------- (10) 
   2
ˆ
ˆX nα= (∵  x = y constant) 
         
ˆ
 (from the demand-supply equality of the ' ' resource)m mα= --- (11) 
Revenue earned by 2X producers,  
2 2(1 )P s X nxq+ =  
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IRS brought about by increase in ‘n’ (external economies of scale) which is transmitted 
into rise in ‘m’ leads to fall in unit cost as observable from the 1st term in the RHS of 
equation (9) since α >1.  
2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ [1 ( 1) ]
ˆ
ˆOr, (1 )  (12.1)
1
Using (6) we can write,
ˆ
 ;where >0  (13)
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ˆ
0
ˆ
X
S
>  under the sufficient condition [1 ( 1) ]Aα− − ≥ 0. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: Subsidy increases output of the SEZ if[1 ( 1) ]Aα− − 0≥ . 
 Now, Jones (1965) allows us to write: 
1
ˆˆ
ˆ
mX Bp Ch= − +  (since K= K given, L= L given) while B>0, C>0. ----- (14) 
Using (11) and (12.1), we can rewrite (14) as  
( ) 21 2
ˆ[1 ( 1) ]
ˆˆ ˆ 1 XAX B X Ch
A
α
α
α α
 
− −
= − + − + 
 
------------------------------- (15) 
Under the sufficient condition [1 ( 1) ]Aα− − ≥ 0, the first term in the RHS of (15) tends to 
reduce 1X . This is due to shifting of resources away from sector 1 to the SEZ aided sector 
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2. The 2nd term gives the rise in agricultural output resulting from increase in productivity 
of the workers brought about by increase in efficiency of the agricultural workforce: 
ˆ
h hh dS dW
S W
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
------------------------------------------------------------- (16) 
Since more and more people shift to the higher wage paying industrial and service 
sectors, the money wage received by the remaining people in agriculture will increase, 
leading to increase in h. Now, there is increased government spending (assuming β<1) on 
modern advanced technology which will further improve workers’ efficiency. So, as a 
combined effect of these two, h will increase more than the increase in W; so wage rate 
per efficiency unit W
h
 
 
 
 will fall. 
In the RHS of (15), if the second term i.e., ˆh  is stronger than the 1st term (which can be 
possible if government would spend a sizable amount of subsidy to enhance productivity 
of the remaining agricultural workforce when there is large scale exodus from the 
agricultural sector), sector 1 will also be able to expand. We state this in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: SEZ and agriculture can go hand in hand even though there is large 
scale exodus from agriculture if the government spends sufficient amount on 
modern technology to foster productivity of agricultural workers. 
So, industrialization aided by SEZs is likely to have a favourable effect on agricultural 
productivity. With industrialization, as more and more people shift to the industrial and 
the services sectors, pressure on agricultural land will fall and average landholding will 
increase as some of the emigrants going away from the rural sector will sell off their land 
to the people who would stay back. An increase in average landholding in the agricultural 
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sector would, in turn, help consolidate fragmented pieces of landholding, which again 
would make possible the use of modern technology. Indeed, excessive fragmentation of 
land in India is one of the main constraints to the introduction of advanced methods of 
production. If land is consolidated, this constraint would be relaxed. It may be mentioned 
that in the advanced countries 2% to 4% of the population is engaged in agriculture. But 
this small fraction of people is able to feed the entire country. This is made possible by 
the very high levels of productivity of labour in the agricultural sector, which again is the 
result of advanced technology. If a similar pattern can emerge in India, the increase in the 
productivity of labour in the agricultural sector can indeed compensate for the loss of 
production due to shifting of resources away from agriculture to the industrial sectors 
aided by SEZ. 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
This paper attempts to show that it is possible for both SEZ and agriculture to grow 
simultaneously if the subsidy policy is designed in an appropriate way. We have 
considered increasing returns brought about by external scale economies due to 
localization of similar industries in the industrial sector aided by SEZ and have taken 
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type production function absolutely tenable with IRS; while the 
resource used to produce each variety is produced itself using CRS technology. CRS also 
prevails in agricultural sector. In this model, we have seen that a significant part of the 
subsidy must be spent on the use of modern technology in agriculture to improve the 
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productivity of the remaining sections of the workforce in the agricultural sector to 
achieve expansion in agriculture along with SEZ-led industrialization. The final 
outcomes, of course rely much on the political will of the government.  
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